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LEGAL REALISM, STRUCTURAL REVIEW, AND
PROPHECY
Mark V. Tushnet*
Michael Perry's book, The Constitution, the Courts, and Human
Rights" is the latest in a series of efforts to reconstruct constitutional

theory. These efforts, I believe, result from an unconscious recognition
that liberal political theory has failed, and from a desperate effort to
suppress that recognition. The failure of liberal theory is both intellec-

tual and political. I can compress a complex argument in the following
way.
Liberal theory originates from an effort to solve the problem of

social order in an individualist, and capitalist society. Thomas Hobbes
argued that order could be created only by subordinating individual
desire to the dictates of an unconstrained sovereign." Because Hobbes'

sovereign was actually the British monarch, his solution was unattractive to those elements of the bourgeoisie who believed the existing monarchy subjected them to unnecessary restraints. John Locke and the

Glorious Revolution offered an alternative solution to the problem of
order: the sovereign who enforced order would be constrained by the

rule of law.4 In the twentieth century Locke's solution unravelled. The

rule of law had to be enforced by judges. Legal realists demonstrated
that the idea that general rules announced in advance limited what the

Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center, B.A., Harvard University (1967);
M.A., Yale University (1971); J.D., Yale University (1971). Readers should know that, by arrangement with the editors of the Review, this article is adapted from the draft of a chapter of a
work in progress, tentatively entitled Red, White, and Blue: A Critical Analysis of Constitutional
Law. Michael Perry's book is one of the topics discussed in the chapter. To make it possible for
one to read this article without reading the rest of the work, I have repeated some of the fundamentals of my analysis even though they have appeared elsewhere. Those who notice the repetitions are accurate and have my apologies. Though I have tried to eliminate the references to other
parts of the manuscript, some of my broader conclusions rest on arguments developed there. I
have retained some of those conclusions, knowing that they are not fully supported in this article.
1. M. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS (1982). Other works
of constitutional theory are J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POUITICAL PROCEss (1980); J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW

(1978).

Preliminary versions on these works are Tushnet, Darkness on the Edge of Town: The Contributions of John Hart Ely to Constitutional Theory. 89 YALE L.J. 1037 (1980); Tushnet, The
Dilemmas of Liberal Constitutionalism, 42 OHIO ST. LJ. 411 (1981); Tushnet, Dia-Tribe (Book
Review), 78 MICH. L. REV. 694 (1980).
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judges could do was a fantasy. Since the time of the realists, the battle
has been over the methods by which judges can be constrained. The
law-and-economics movement offered a fleeting solution: we did not
have to worry about the judges because they could act only when private litigants brought cases before them and market-like processes
would inevitably suppress exercises of judicial will. Other solutions are
the kinds of constitutional theory embodied in works like Perry's.
I.
Political events also influenced the resurgence of interest in constitutional theory. The development of the welfare state was capitalism's
response to the political problems created by capitalist expansion under
conditions of widespread political enfranchisement. 7 However, the welfare state generated its own political difficulties, which the Supreme
Court responded to in the 1960's. Justice Hugo Black developed a powerful critique of the Court's response by arguing that the way in which
the Court acted demonstrated it was indeed unconstrained.8 In one
sense, efforts like Perry's are designed to answer Justice Black's critique by showing that some general theory-perhaps not "the Court's"
but someone's-will do the job of limiting judges, just as judges limit
the sovereign, and just as the sovereign limits individuals.
I have said that liberal political theory seems to have failed. My
evidence, in part, is that the legal realist critique of the rule of law can
be applied at every level to which defenders of liberalism retreat. That
is, every proffered constitutional theory can be shown to contain the
possibility of directly contradictory resolutions of every problem in constitutional law. Theorists acknowledge this when (as they almost inevitably do) they conclude that all we can expect is that judges will sensitively balance the considerations the theorists have identified. That,
however, is to concede Justice Black's point, which was developed precisely in response to claims that first amendment cases should be decided by balancing the relevant interests.
The political failure of liberalism is evident in contemporary politics. The welfare state which has evolved in response to capitalist development has proved to be politically unstable. The Hobbesian problem

5. See generally T. BENDITT, LAW As RULE AND PRINCIPLE 1-21 (1978).
6. See Priest, The Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient Rules. 6 J. LEGAL
STUD. 65 (1977); Priest, Selective Characteristics of Litigation. 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 399 (1980).
7. See. e.g., R. CLOWARD & F. PIVEN, THE NEW CLAss WAR (1982).
8. Black offered his own solution, interpretivism, which, I argue elsewhere, does not in fact
eliminate the difficulties with which Black was concerned. See Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid
Down. 96 HARV. L. REV. 781 (1983).
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of order is with us again. The upsurge of interest in constitutional theory is plainly designed to protect the legacy of the Warren Court. In
other words, the goal is to protect the welfare-state solution to the
Hobbesian problem from political instability by constitutionalizing it.
When viewed in this light, the desperation in constitutional theory is
not surprising. Politically, the very structure of modern capitalism, and
intellectually, the very notion of the rule of law, are at issue.
What makes Perry's work so important is that, not entirely willingly or consistently, it breaks with the individualist premises of liberal
political theory. It indicates the direction in which I believe constitutional scholarship ought to move without, I am sad to say, actually
moving one inch in that direction. To flesh out this conclusion, I must
start with the legal realists.
II.
I have mentioned the realist critique of rules, which is by now familiar.10 One branch of realism pursued its insights into the realm of
political sociology. These realists concluded that, if jurisprudence could
not explain what the judges were doing, social science could. That is,
they viewed law as a phenomenon that scholars ought to explain rather
than as an activity in which scholars should engage. I do not want to
discuss the explanations which the realists offered. For various reasons
those explanations were inadequate. Rather, I want to explore the legacy realism left to normative constitutional theory."
The threat which realism posed to the rule of law was most apparent in constitutional law. If judges deciding contract cases got out of
line and imposed their values on an unwilling populace, the legislature
could always intervene to set things right. Of course, the incoherence of
liberal political theory would then emerge. The legislature would correct judicial tyranny, and thereby increase the risk of legislative tyranny, which when realized would require correction by judges. We
would not end up with a system devoid of tyranny, but with one in
which the forms of tyranny continually replaced each other. Even without elaborating upon the vision of judicial and legislative overreaching,
scholars of constitutional law knew their subject was different from
contract law. If the Justices of the Supreme Court decided to write
their personal values into law (which, according to the realists, was
what they necessarily did) there was nothing, at least formally and in
the short run, the rest of us could do about it. Somehow constitutional

9. See supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text.
10. See generally T. BENDITr, supra note 5.
1I. See. e.g.. J. ELY, supra note 1, at 44-48.
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lawyers had to domesticate legal realism if they were to preserve their
enterprise.
They did so by first relegating the descriptive thrust of realism to
political science departments, and then by reappropriating the political
scientists' insights.1 2 Robert Dahl provided the most important perception for this discussion." Upon examining Supreme Court decisions
holding federal legislation unconstitutional, Dahl discovered that in
most cases the Court invalidated statutes enacted years before, where
support by contemporary political majorities was questionable. Where
the Court acted to block recently enacted federal legislation, its decisions tended to erode rather rapidly. Dahl did, however, raise questions
about the details of his analysis. He noted that the analysis concentrated on invalidation of federal rather than state legislation; and it
focused on a period before the expansion of notions of standing allowed
challengers to get to court quite rapidly after a statute was enacted.
However, its central thrust is clear: in the medium-to-long run, judicial
review does not matter very much. In most instances, judicial review
simply eases the burden on those who would eliminate obsolete statutes.
Instead of having to overcome legislative inertia to eliminate the statutes, one can turn to the courts. This conclusion is weakened, however,
by political scientists' studies of the impact of Supreme Court decisions. The evidence is not comprehensive, but it seems fair to say that
controversial Supreme Court decisions will be implemented only in
those special circumstances that involve such variables as how bureaucracies sympathetic to the decisions operate." Supreme Court decisions
make a difference, it seems, when contemporary political majorities, or
near-majorities, want them to make a difference.
Several difficulties arise in attempting to eliminate concern about
the risk of judicial tyranny by invoking the realities of the political
world. The first is to explain why political realities actually do constrain the judges. Ordinarily three mechanisms of political control are
invoked. First, a tyrannical decision can be overturned by constitutional
amendment.1 However, this is inadequate, even on the formal level, if

12. The primary contributors to this process were A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS
(1962), and C. BLACK, THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT (1960). A descendant is J.
supra note 1.
13. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-.
Maker, 6 J. PuB. L. 279 (1957).
BRANCH
CHOPER,

14. See generally T.

BECKER, THE IMPACT OF SUPREME COURT DECISIONS

(T. Becker &

M. Feely eds. 1973); W. MUIR, PRAYER IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS (1967).
15. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970). For example, the twenty-sixth amendment,
guaranteeing the right to vote to those over eighteen, was adopted within six months of the Supreme Court decision in Oregon v. Mitchell, holding. unconstitutional a congressional statute that
sought the same end.
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our concern is that judicial review thwarts majority will. The amendment process requires super-majorities, two-thirds of the national legislature and three-quarters of the states. A minority-larger to be sure
than five Justices of the Supreme Court, but still a minority-may
block the adoption of an amendment. The best contemporary example
is the failure of the equal rights amendment to receive ratification. Political surveys indicated that a majority of the American people, but
less than two-thirds, supported the amendment. The outcome is thus
consistent with the constitutional scheme, but it is also an example of
the inability of the amendment process to serve the majority's will.
The second mechanism of political control has recently received
attention from Charles Black and Michael Perry. a Congress has the
power to regulate the jurisdiction of the federal courts." According to
Black and Perry, if Congress disagrees with some constitutional ruling
by the Supreme Court, it may remove cases raising similar issues from
the Court's jurisdiction. For example, proponents of voluntary prayer in
public schools have offered legislation that would eliminate the Court's
jurisdiction over cases involving regulations authorizing such prayers.' 8
Reliance on congressional power over the Court's jurisdiction suffers from both formal and political problems. The position taken by
Black and Perry is opposed by the substantial weight of scholarly opinion. Most scholars argue that Congress may not selectively restrict the
Court's jurisdiction to keep it from deciding a class of cases based on
Congress' prediction about how the Court would decide those cases."
That, they say, interferes with the role of the Court in the constitutional scheme. In the world of pure constitutional theory, the fact that
most scholars disagree with Black and Perry would not matter very
much. Black and Perry might be right and everyone else wrong. But we
are not in the world of theory anymore. What matters here is how
politics operates. The scholarly consensus is a political force that keeps
Congress from enacting jurisdiction-restricting legislation. The propos-

16. C. BLAcK, DECISION ACCORDING TO LAW (1981); M. PERRY, supra note 1. Perry qualifies his position by limiting it to decisions by the Supreme Court not based on values constitutionalized by the framers. But since he also argues that (virtually) no recent decisions are based on
such values, Perry's qualification can be ignored here.
17. "In all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, c1. 2. See generally L. TRIBE, supra note 1, 1 3-5.
18. Drafting a statute that accomplishes the desired goals may be difficult. The prayer statutes, for example, run into the problem that the restriction of jurisdiction occurs only after the
Court decides that "voluntary" prayer is involved, a determination that provides the Court with an
obvious point for maneuver. However, drafting difficulties can be defended as positively beneficial;
they remind Congress of the seriousness of what it is doing.
19. See M. PERRY, supra note I, at 128-39.
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als have not been adopted because enough members of Congress who
think the Court overreached itself nonetheless think it would be unconstitutional to restrict the Court's jurisdiction, despite the opinions of
Black and Perry.
The formal problem further limits the likelihood that jurisdictionrestricting legislation will be enacted. Suppose one of the prayer proposals is enacted. The relevant precedents remain on the books and
state courts remain bound by them. Some state courts will take the
legislation as a license to reconsider the precedents, and some will not.
Of those that do, some may decide that the precedents were wrongly
decided, and some may reaffirm them. Restricting the Court's jurisdiction will have the effect of creating an unreviewable body of divergent
interpretations of the same federal Constitution. This might not be intolerable as a matter of policy. However, it is politically risky for those
who disagree with the precedents and support the jurisdiction-restricting legislation. Legislators from states where the precedents are not reconsidered or are reaffirmed will face puzzled constituents who will
find, after all the shouting has died down, that nothing has changed
and they are still not allowed to sponsor voluntary group prayers in
schools. Their representatives, they may think, have not done the job.
Doubts about the constitutionality of jurisdiction-restricting legislation,
coupled with the political risk involved, has made it extremely difficult
for Congress to enact such laws. These problems mean that we cannot
treat Congress' failure to restrict jurisdiction as a majoritarian endorsement of what the Court has done. Political analysis of jurisdictional
restrictions shows that in today's world this mechanism cannot constrain the judges.
The final political mechanism to control judges over the middle-tolong run is the most important. The Supreme Court is an enduring
institution with a regularly changing membership. The President and
the Senate (for present purposes, the sovereign of liberal political theory) determine over time what the composition of the Court is, and
thus determine what constitutional law is.2 0 The appointment mechanism may reduce the risk of judicial tyranny over the long run, but it
does not eliminate the theoretical problems. First, the legislature can
influence constitutional law only indirectly. When appointing a judge
for a life term, the legislature must predict how that judge will behave
in a wide range of cases, some of which might be impossible to imagine
at the time of appointment. Ordinarily, the appointee's background will'
give the legislature a fairly good basis for the predictions. However,

20. "The President shall . . .nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the
Senate, shall appoint. . .Judges of the supreme Court,. . ."U.S. CoNsT. art. 11,§ 2,cl.I & 2.
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inaccurate guesses about the future are inevitable, and from the point
of view of those who want to eliminate judicial tyranny, may be disastrous. Perhaps the best recent example is Richard Nixon's appointment
of four proponents of judicial restraint and conservatism, three of
whom voted to restrict severely state power to regulate abortions.
A second difficulty with the appointment mechanism is that it is
effective only over the middle-to-long run. Yet the costs to the public
between the time a tyrannizing decision is made and the time it is repudiated by a new majority on the Court can be quite high. Again the
abortion cases serve as an example. If one thinks that abortion is murder, the Supreme Court has licensed that type of murder, and it is cold
comfort that because of potential new appointments, the license may be
withdrawn after fifteen or twenty years and millions of murders."
Finally, relying on the appointment process to check the courts
simply reintroduces the problem of legislative tyranny. The best we can
hope for is repeated oscillation between a system in which judges defer
to legislative will and allow the legislature to tyrannize over defeated
parties, and a system in which judges do not defer and themselves tyrannize on behalf of the parties defeated in the legislature. After a time
one system will be converted into the other, but neither one solves the
problems of liberalism.
III.
There is an even deeper difficulty with this kind of reliance on political reality. The argument has been that in the long run judicial review does not make a difference because political constraints on the
judges will keep their positions consistent with those held by the powerful. If that is so, it is hard to see the point of constitutional theory,
except as a weapon in a political struggle to determine who will be
powerful. Certainly it is pointless to make normative recommendations
about how a series of cases should be decided. Such recommendations
may occasionally lead one of the Justices to take one position or another, and in the short run that may make some slight difference. That,
however, means only that one can occasionally use the courts as a forum to accomplish one's political goals, just as one might use a city
council or a street demonstration. Nor does it make much sense to
devote too much time to describing how the courts work. If one takes
the long view, one ends up describing how power operates in a specific

21. Opponents of prior decisions may, by taking a lesson from the realists, exploit loop-holes
inevitably left by the decisions. The experiences with capital punishment are illustrative. Compare
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), with Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972); and H.L.
v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981), with Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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locus. This concern for power probably ought to lead one to see how it
operates in institutions such as corporations, legislatures, and bureaucracies that are more central than the courts in the daily governing of
society. If one takes a shorter view, one ends up writing a judicial biography. It is interesting to try to understand, for example, how Potter
Stewart came to confront his Midwestern Republican background and
the limits of his transcendence of that background.2 2 But that enterprise is far removed from the concerns that lead liberal political theory
to devote attention to the courts.
One of the most recent developments in constitutional theory embraces the political scientists' conclusions that judicial review basically
does not matter, and that judicial review should have some normative
content. This theory, sometimes called structural due process, has not
yet been systematically defended as a general theory of judicial review,
and as we will see, with good reason. 3 Instead, commentators have noticed that the Court seems to be doing something novel in a few areas,
and have given the label "structural review" to the phenomenon without articulating its basis. Structural review, in all the areas in which it
appears, involves paying attention to the decisionmaker rather than to
the decision. 4 Governmental actions will be unconstitutional under
structural review if they were taken by agency A-an administrative
agency or the courts, for example-when they should have been taken
by agency B-the executive or the legislature. A second form of structural review imposes a requirement that, whatever agency makes a decision, and whatever the substance of the decision be, the decision must
be made in an adequately-reasoned manner. As we will see, structural
review faces two related questions: First, why should agency A rather
than B be required as the source of the action? Second, given that
structural review places no limits on the substance of what government
may do, how can it satisfy the requirement that the Constitution constrain the government? The answers, I will argue, are that structural
review attempts to remake the legislative process into the image of the
judicial process, and that in doing so, judges are not surprisingly blind
to the difficulty that both a judicialized legislature and a legislative
judiciary fail to solve liberalism's problems. In order to make that argument, I must first survey the areas in which structural review has
been invoked.

REV.

22. See Maltz, The Concept of the Doctrine of the Court in Constitutional Law, 16 GA. L.
357 (1982) (calling this "atomistic analysis").
23. See L. TRIBE, supra note 1, §§ 17-1, -2, .3,and Supp. 103-04 (1979).
24.

Id.
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IV.
The modern era of structural review began with Hampton v. Mow
Sun Wong. s6 The Civil Service Commission had adopted a regulation
barring resident aliens from employment in the federal competitive civil
service. The plaintiffs included aliens who sought jobs as postal workers, janitors, file clerks, and typists; positions as to which their citizenship status would seem irrelevant. The plaintiffs challenged the regulation on the ground that it discriminated against aliens without
adequate justification. The Justices analyzed the problem differently.
Justice Stevens' majority opinion acknowledged that "overriding national interests" might justify restricting federal employment to citizens.2 6 For example, such a restriction might encourage aliens to become citizens, or, more plausibly, its existence might provide the
President with a bargaining chip in treaty negotiations: "if you relax
your tariff restrictions, we will let your citizens get federal jobs." However, those interests were the domain of Congress and the President,
not of the Civil Service Commission. The Commission was a management and employment agency, which had neither the mandate nor the
expertise to impose regulations that would serve foreign policy
interests.27
Two observations are important at the outset. First, the Court suggested that, had the identical regulation been promulgated by the President instead of the Civil Service Commission, it would have been constitutional. Certainly the structural ground which the Court relied on
would have been unavailable. And indeed, immediately after the
Court's decision, the President did promulgate the same regulations.
When they were challenged, the federal courts found them permissible.28 Thus, Hampton demonstrates precisely how structural review
does not impose substantive limits on governmental action.
Second, the Court did not invalidate the regulation because Congress had failed to authorize the Commission to take foreign policy into
account in formulating its employment policies. Had it done so, Hampton would be an ordinary case in administrative law, a case about an
agency that exceeded the bounds of its statutory authority. Rather, the
Court said that even though Congress purported to authorize the Commission to consider foreign policy, that authorization was constitution-

25. 426 U.S. 88 (1976).
26. Id. at 100.
27. Id. at 105-17.
28. Mow Sun Wong v. Campbell, 626 F.2d 739 (9th Cir. 1980). cert. denied. 450 U.S. 959
(1982). The Supreme Court decided Hampton on June 1. 1976; the regulation was repromulgated
on September 2, 1976.
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ally impermissible. Seen in this light, Hampton is a revival of a doctrine prohibiting the delegation of "legislative" authority to
administrative agencies or private groups.
The nondelegation doctrine was last invoked in 1935 to invalidate
the National Industrial Recovery Act." The Act authorized the President to promulgate "codes of fair competition" for an industry. These
codes, usually proposed by trade associations, regulated trade practices,
minimum wages and prices, and collective bargaining. The Court held
that Congress had provided no standards by which a "code of fair competition" could be identified. Instead, it had transferred its legislative
authority to the President and the trade associations."0
Even in the NIRA case the Court found it difficult to specify exactly why the Act involved an excessive delegation. The growth of the
welfare state and its associated administrative bureaucracies inevitably
meant the nondelegation doctrine would fall on hard times. One characteristic of the administrative state is precisely that the legislature
confers substantial discretionary power on bureaucracies to handle
problems when they arise. Using a strict definition of "legislative authority" in the nondelegation doctrine would have seriously impeded
the necessary operations of the welfare state. The doctrine thus fell into
1
disuse until recently.
The nondelegation doctrine and Hampton's approach are obviously
close relatives. The former involves the delegation by Congress of all of
its legislative authority; the latter involves the delegation of some authority to the wrong agency. Other instances of structural review suggest the first level of rationale for the theory. Justice Powell's opinions
in two affirmative action cases, and Chief Justice Burger's opinion in
one of them, emphasized the concern that the right agency make controversial decisions. University of California Regents v. Bakke' involved an affirmative action plan for admission to one of the University's medical schools. Justice Powell thought the plan was

Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
30. Id. at 537-42.
31. In one case the Court construed the statutory authority of agencies to charge fees narrowly to avoid a delegation problem. If agencies had broad authority to charge fees, they would in
effect be doing the legislative job of imposing taxes. National Cable Television Ass'n v. United
States, 415 U.S. 336 (1974). In another case Justice Rehnquist would have held portions of the
Occupational Safety and Health Act unconstitutional because Congress had failed to specify what
it meant when it told the agency to set standards which assured "to the extent feasible" that
workers would not suffer from health problems after being exposed to toxic materials. Industrial
Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 681-82 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring). See also American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 543 (1981) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting).
32. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
29.
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unconstitutional, although he recognized that similar plans had gained
wide acceptance in related areas. For example, in many cases the federal courts had approved plans designed to eliminate the results of discriminatory practices. Administrative agencies had also imposed such
plans in similar situations. Justice Powell agreed that affirmative action
was permitted to eliminate "the disabling effects of identified discrimination. ' 3 Anticipating the University's claim that its affirmative action
plan was designed to do just that, Justice Powell said:
[The University] does not purport to have made, and is in no position to
make, . . . findings [of past discrimination]. Its broad mission is education, not the formulation of any legislative policy or the adjudication of
particular claims of illegality. . . . [I]solated segments of our vast governmental structures are not competent to make those decisions, at least
in the absence of legislative mandates and legislatively determined

criteria."
When the Court upheld a provision of the 1977 Public Works Employment Act that reserved ten percent of the funds for businesses
owned and controlled by members of certain minorities, Justice Powell
and the Chief Justice examined the legislative history in detail.8' They
concluded that, although the Act itself contained no specific statements
that Congress had found widespread discrimination in construction
projects, the legislative history demonstrated that such discrimination
existed and that Congress enacted the "minority set-aside" to remedy
that discrimination.e Thus, in contrast to Bakke, the remedial decision
37
was made by a "competent" body.
33. Id. at 307.
34. Id. at 309.
35. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
36. Id. at 490-92.
37. Similar approaches are found in the constitutional law of criminal procedure. For example, under the double jeopardy clause, it has been said that a legislature may not impose multiple
punishments for the same offense. Determining whether a legislature has done so has proved to be
nearly impossible. In Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333 (1981), the Court solved the problem by holding that "the question of what punishments are constitutionally permissible is not
different from the question of what punishment the Legislative Branch intended to be imposed.
Where Congress intended . . . to impose multiple punishments, imposition of such sentences does
not violate the Constitution." Id. at 344. Thus the double jeopardy clause does not limit Congress'
power. at most it requires that Congress be clear about what it wants to do.
In Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975), the Court held that Maine's homicide laws
unconstitutionally shifted the burden of proof to the defendant who claimed to have acted "in the
heat of passion" and who therefore sought to reduce the degree of the crime from murder to
manslaughter. Two years later in Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977), the Court held
that New York's revised criminal code could constitutionally require a defendant charged with
murder to establish that he or she acted "under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance"
in order to reduce the degree of culpability. New York's defense was a modern version of Maine's,
and three dissenters argued that the cases were indistinguishable. Among the grounds of distinc-
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All these cases are tied together by structural review's concern for
allocating decisionmaking authority to the proper agencies of government. But how do we know what the "proper" agency is? Justice Powell said that the mission of the University of California was education,
not finding and remedying past discrimination." However, as in Hampton,3 9 he did not say the University had exceeded the authority granted
it by the people of California in adopting the affirmative action plan.
Nor, in light of generally accepted principles of constitutional law,
could he have done so. Ordinarily, matters of allocating decisionmaking
authority within the states are not regulated by the federal Constitution. If the mpeople of California want to eliminate the post of Governor,
or establish a system of neighborhood governments completely autonomous from each other, they can do SO. 40 Similarly, one would have
thought before Bakke that the people of California could create a-University with two missions: one educational and the other to find and
remedy discrimination in education.
Justice Powell seems motivated by a concern that the people of
California really did not make that decision at all. More generally, this
branch of structural review is concerned that certain decisions be made
by agencies of the government which are more responsive to the electorate than other agencies. As Justice Rehnquist put it, "it ensures to the
extent consistent with orderly government administration that important choices of social policy are made by. . . the branch of our government most responsive to the popular will.""' This notion makes sense of
Hampton's distinction between the President, who is elected in part
precisely to make foreign policy decisions, and the Civil Service Commission, whose members are not selected to do that; and of Justice
Powell's distinction between Congress and state legislatures, which can
adopt affirmative action plans, and state universities, which cannot.
There will inevitably be problems of classification,' but the central

tion is the structural one, that Maine's defense was developed by the courts while New York's was
developed by the legislature.
38. University of California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 309 (1978).
39. See supra notes 25-30 and accompanying text.
40. Subject to the judicially-unenforceable guarantee clause. U.S. CoNsr. art. IV, § 4. See
generally Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912).
41. Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 685 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
42. For example, one district judge invoked structural review to invalidate a regulation
promulgated by the federal Department of Transportation requiring that state highway departments set aside a portion of their budget for minority enterprises. Central Ala. Paving, Inc. v.
James, 499 F. Supp. 629 (M.D. Ala. 1980). See also Menora v. Illinois High School Ass'n, 683
F.2d 1030, 1036 (7th Cir. 1982) (rejecting suggestion that association, because of likely insensitivity to religious freedom, be required to bear heavier burden of justifying its regulation than would
be the case if legislature had adopted regulation).
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idea is clear enough.
Structural review that is concerned with government responsiveness to the electorate is, however, beset by two difficulties. One is empirical and has two dimensions. First, the concern with responsiveness
and accountability draws some support from unarticulated assumptions
about competence, to use Justice Powell's word. It might be thought
that members of the Civil Service Commission were appointed to be
personnel managers and not makers of foreign policy. They therefore
might lack competence to make personnel decisions in light of foreign
policy considerations. This, however, misconceives both the appointment and policymaking processes. Members of the Commission might
be chosen primarily because of their managerial qualities. Within the
pool of qualified personnel managers, however, there will inevitably be
people qualified to make an occasional foreign policy decision. There is
no reason to think that, in general, the selection will systematically exclude those who could competently, and of course, only occasionally,
think about the relationship between personnel and foreign policies. In
addition, it misconceives the policymaking process, and magnifies the
differences between the President and the Civil Service Commission, to
imagine that the regulation barring aliens from the civil service emanated only from "the Commission" or "the President." The regulation
was undoubtedly produced after a study by members of the Commission staff, who undoubtedly consulted both formally and informally
with members of other staffs knowledgeable about foreign policy. A
"presidential" regulation would be produced through similar staff efforts. Perhaps the distribution of expertise in the two staff processes
would differ; the Commission's staff process would probably give more
weight to personnel considerations and less to foreign policy than the
President's staff process would, but it is hard to see as marked a difference as Hampton suggests. Given the complexity of public policymaking, this difficulty with structural review is quite general. Structural
review, in this branch, is predicated on a vision of an imaginary policymaking process in which rational deliberation has a large place, and
attaches constitutional consequences to the judges' efforts to distinguish
between one or another imaginary process.
The second dimension of the empirical difficulty with structural
review identifies another point where an imaginary democratic process
is substituted for the real one. For example, Justice Powell's reasoning
in Bakke is that the affirmative action plan was devised by the faculty
of the University's medical school, only formally ratified by the University's governing board, and was not given the slightest bit of attention
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by the California legislature."' That thought, however accurate it might
be in some contexts, seriously underestimates the degree of political
attention that university affirmative action plans (especially for professional schools) receive from state legislatures. In Wisconsin, the offices
of administrative officials regularly receive calls from irate parents of
applicants, and letters from legislators whom those parents have called
as constituents, complaining about the adverse impact of the affirmative action plan on their child's application. I dare say that university
administrators in every state have spent a great deal of time defending
affirmative action plans to skeptical legislators. Within the university,
the message is clear: the administrators acknowledge faculty responsibility for and autonomy in developing those plans, but repeatedly point
out that some plans will be more controversial than others. Further,
since affirmative action plans for admission are frequently tied to special scholarship programs, state legislatures directly affect the operation of the plans by their control over the budget for scholarships.4
Again the point is general. All agencies of government, except the federal courts, are either directly or indirectly responsible to the people.
As a general matter there is no reason to think that indirect responsibility to the people leads to weaker controls over the agents than direct
responsibility provides. The bureaucrats' protection by civil service regulations is countered by the incumbent's automatic electoral advantage
in insulating both from political accountability. This is especially true
where such politically sensitive issues-in Justice Rehnquist's terms,

43.

See Sandalow. Racial Preferences in Higher Education: Political Responsibility and

the Judicial Role, 42 U. Cm. L. REV. 653, 695-96 (1975).
44. In this connection, a recent comment by Phillip Johnson deserves notice. Paul Gewirtz
had criticized "the jurisprudence of hypotheticals" as unrealistic. He used as one of his examples
an admissions program that "preferred blacks for 100 percent of the slots," and argued that such
a hypothetical was not a fair challenge to his suggestion that courts should defer to the political
process in this area, because it was premised on assumptions about how the political process
worked that were inconsistent with the assumptions justifying the deferential approach. Gewirtz,
The Jurisprudenceof Hypotheticals. 32 J. LEGAL EDUC. 120, 120 (1982). Johnson. a professor of
law at the University of California-Berkeley, replied that the "School of Criminology at UC
Berkeley once set aside 50 percent of its admissions for minorities. This was done under the influence of a clique of Marxist professors. . . .Theoretically the regents of the university could have
put a stop to the program, but for a variety of reasons it is extremely awkward for them to deal
with such an issue at an individual school." Id. at 124-25. Johnson fails to note that the awkwardness can be overcome, as it was at UC Berkeley, by dismantling the School of Criminology, termi-.
nating the appointments of most of the "clique of Marxist professors." and transferring some of
the positions they held to (aha!) the law school of the UC Berkeley. On closing of the school, see
Crime Doesn't Pay. NEWSWEEK, June 17, 1974, at 59. On the transfer of positions to the law
school, see Kadish, Foreword.68 CALIF. L. REV. 202, 202 (1980); Selznick, Jurisprudence.and
Social Policy: Aspirations and Perspectives, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 206, 206-07 (1980) (quoting committee report proposing program dated Aug. 23, 1974). All in all, not the strongest counterexampies Johnson might have hoped for.
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such "important choices of social poliy"48-as affirmative action are
involved. Indeed, one would have thought that the distinction between
indirect and direct responsibility would be weakest precisely in areas
where the social policy was most important and controversial.
By introducing the notion of political sensitivity, I have identified
the conceptual difficulty of structural review. The difficulty is that no
one has yet specified when structural review is appropriate. The Hampton Court noted that the regulation in question would have been unconstitutionally discriminatory against aliens had it been adopted by a
state legislature. Structural review was triggered by the fact that the
national government's special power over foreign policy was the only
thing that could save an otherwise obviously unconstitutional provision.
But it is hard to see how this triggering mechanism is justified or how
it could be generalized into an entire theory of structural review. In
every constitutional case an otherwise unconstitutional rule is justified
by some purported policy. On the model of Hampton, then, we would
always have to ask whether the policy was made by the "right" agency
of government. Structural review would then indeed be a comprehensive theory of judicial review, but because of the empirical difficulties
already discussed, it would leave the judges wholly unconstrained in
their determination of what the "right" agency is. That, I take it, is
why the nondelegation doctrine has rarely been invoked since the
1930's and the growth of the welfare state. Even Justice Rehnquist's
formulation, which allows delegation "to the extent consistent with orderly government administration," left room enough for seven other
Justices to find a permissible delegation." Similarly, structural review
fails to specify how much attention an issue must get in the legislature
before the courts will attribute a decision on the issue as a decision by
the appropriate body. Given Bakke, Justice Powell could not treat silent acquiescence in an administrative policy as enough attention, but
he was willing to accept a detailed legislative history as sufficient attention in the minority set-aside case.4 Justice Stevens, in contrast, would
have required that the set-aside statute itself contain legislative findings
of fact regarding past discrimination." Yet in another case, involving
the interpretation of a congressional enactment in light of constitutional concerns over federalism, Justice Stevens accepted statements in
committee reports as providing a clear indication of Congress' intention

45. Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 685 (1980) (Rehnquist, J.. dissenting).
46. See American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490 (1981) (only Chief Justice
Burger joined the dissent of Justice Rehnquist).
47. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 503-06 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring).
48.

Id. at 549-54 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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to make states liable for attorneys' fees if they lost civil rights cases
against state employees.4 ' In contrast, Justice Powell wanted the states
to be named explicitly in the statute as potentially liable for those
fees.80 In deciding to invoke structural review, and in deciding when its
requirements are satisfied, the Court has failed to confine its own
discretion.
V.
The delegation-related theories of Hampton and the affirmative
action cases form one branch of structural review, in which we are concerned that the proper agency, usually thought of as the more democratically responsible and perhaps more rational one, makes a decision.
I have presented the internal critique that this branch of structural review is analytically indefensible on its own terms. A second branch of
structural review tells us to be concerned that the proper agency make
the decision in the correct manner." This branch has been developed
most forcefully by Justice Brennan in a series of cases involving the
equal protection clause. The equal protection clause requires, speaking
in the most general terms, that there be justification for treating two
classes of individuals differently. 3 This branch of structural review is
concerned with the process of discovering those justifications. The
traditional view is that courts can articulate justifications: "legislatures
are presumed to have acted constitutionally even if source materials
normally resorted to for ascertaining their grounds for action are otherwise silent, and their statutory classifications will be set aside only if no
grounds can be conceived to justify them."53 Justice Brennan's view is
that statutory classifications can be found constitutional by examining
whether they are justified by policies articulated in the legislative history or otherwise apparent from the statute's terms. As with all theories of constitutional law, this one is consistent with some cases and
inconsistent with others, and I use the cases only to illustrate how the
theory works.
A series of cases involving the Social Security Act presents a reasonably clear example of the choice between inventing reasons and re49.

Hutto v. Finney, 437

U.S. 678, 694 (1978).

50. Id. at 704-10 (Powell, J., dissenting).
51. See L. TRIBE, supra note i, § 17-3.
52. The classic exposition is Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws. 37
CALIF. L. REv. 341 (1949).
53. McDonald v. Board of Election, 394 U.S. 802, 809 (1969). One structural approach is
not entirely inconsistent with this statement. In his concurring opinion in Kassel v. Consolidated
Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 686-87 (1981), Justice Brennan argued that the courts should
not ignore unconstitutional reasons that are found in the legislative history even if they could
dream up reasons that would make the statute constitutional.

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol8/iss3/13

LEGAL REALISM

1983]

lying only on those apparent in the source materials usually referred to.
Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld" involved a provision that allowed widows
with children in their care, but not widowers with children in their
care, to receive benefits based on the earnings of the deceased spouse.
In Califano v. Goldfarb,5s the statute allowed all widows to receive
benefits, but widowers could receive them only if they had been receiving at least half of their support from the deceased wife. If one were
allowed to invent justifications for these statutes, there is one strong
candidate: these provisions might serve to reduce the income inequalities between men and women over their lifetimes. Because of discrimination in the workplace, women as a class receive less income while
they work than do men. After women die, their spouses receive less
than the surviving spouses of males. If we look at the income of the
unit [family + surviving spouse] over its entire course, providing less
to widowers than to widows equalizes payments to that unit. Further,
the Court has indeed held that different treatment of men and women
can be justified if it is designed "to compensate for particular economic
disabilities suffered by women." ' s Nonetheless, the Court held the statutes in Wiesenfeld and Goldfarb unconstitutional. Justice Brennan's
opinions in both cases examined the history of the provisions. For example, in Wiesenfeld he found that the purpose was "to provide children deprived of one parent with the opportunity for the personal attention of the other,"' 7 and in Goldfarb that the purpose was "to equalize
the protection given to the dependents of women and men."'" Thus,
because the statutes were not intended to compensate women for discrimination in the work force, the Court would not consider whether
the statutes were reasonably capable of accomplishing a purported
compensatory goal.
Three weeks after it decided Goldfarb, the Court found constitutional a provision of the Social Security Act that resulted in higher
benefits for retired women than for retired men." 9 The provision allowed women to exclude more years of low pay from the base upon
which social security benefits are calculated. It thus was directly responsive to the reality that women receive lower pay than men: "allowing women, who as such have been unfairly hindered from earning
as much as men, to eliminate additional low-earning years from the
calculation of their retirement benefits works directly to remedy some

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

420 U.S. 636 (1975).
430 U.S. 199 (1977).
Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 320 (1977).
420 U.S. at 648.
430 U.S. at 216.
Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977).
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part of the effect of past discrimination."

0

Further, the legislative his-

tory showed that the disparity was "purposely enacted

. . .

to compen-

sate for past employment discrimination.""
This branch of structural review might be developed in two directions. One would be to make it a general requirement of equal protection law, and perhaps of all law through the due process clause, that
the reasons for a statute be clearly articulated." That, however, would
destroy the legislative process as we know it. First, much legislation is
adopted by city councils and state legislatures, which keep quite rudimentary records of what precedes formal enactment. Though the situation is changing in many states and in a few cities, there still are relatively few committee reports, few records of debates, and so on. A
requirement of articulated reasons would invalidate much of what is on
the books. Second, frequently-perhaps usually-there are no reasons
for legislation except that the legislators who voted for it thought they
would win votes by doing so, or that this statute seemed a fair compromise between contending political forces." The other direction for developing the "articulated reasons" theory is suggested by the fact that
the main cases all involved what traditionally have been thought of as
suspect or quasi-suspect groups; ones about which we think the legislature may be prejudiced. Structural review says that legislatures may do
things to those groups-exclude them from jobs, compensate for past
discrimination-but we want to be sure that is what the legislature really wants. The anomaly in this direction of development is clear once
we bring Bakke' to mind. It forces into the legislative arena precisely
those issues on which we are skeptical of the legislature's ability to act
fairly.
VI.
Taken together, these internal critiques of structural review in any
of its variants suggest it cannot serve as a theory of constitutional law.
As usual, the external critiques are even more telling. The first external
critique is quite simple. In form, structural review is only suspensory. It
does not bar the government from taking some action, but only seeks to
insure that the government take that action in an appropriate way. By
60. Id. at 318.
61. Id.
62. This line can be developed from the implications of Justice Brennan's views in Kassel v.
Consolidated Freightways Corp.. 450 U.S. 662, 679 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring), and United
States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 182 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
63. See Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REv. 197 (1976); Posner, The
DeFunis Case and the Constitutionalityof Preferential Treatment of Racial Minorities. 1974
Sup. CT. REV. I, 26-31.
64. See supra notes 32-40 and accompanying text.
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avoiding decision on what actions government may take, structural review, it is thought, avoids the problem of judicial tyranny. If, after a
second look, the appropriate agency decides that the policy at issue is
sound, the policy will go into effect. In this way structural review is a
translation into constitutional law of political scientists' arguments that
judicial review does not matter. But the suspensory nature of structural
review is usually illusory, and where it is not, it repudiates the premises
of constitutional theory.
After Hampton was decided, the President, as I have said, immediately repromulgated the regulation. This happened so fast that it was
clear the President, or his staff, had given no more thought to foreign
policy than the Civil Service Commission had. The point is, once more,
general. In the real world of politics, we can predict with great accuracy what the effect of suspensory decisions will be. As in Hampton, we
can predict that the regulation will be readopted, in which case review
has given the illusion but not the reality of constraint. Or, as in Wiesenfeld, we can predict that the statute will not be reenacted, in which
case review has given the reality of constraint and the illusion of legislative freedom. Structural review appears to leave open the possibility
of subsequent correction by the appropriate decision-maker. But that
possibility is in fact miniscule. Canny judges will invoke structural review when they predict that the legislature will be unable to enact legislation that contravenes the judges' personal preferences; they will invoke other modes of review otherwise.
However, suppose the judges guess wrong, and use structural review in cases where the legislature will take the opportunity it has been
given. Then structural review is not constitutional review at all. By definition it is suspensory and imposes no substantive limitations on legislative authority. That means, however, that the legislature can do
whatever it wants, which is what the Constitution is supposed to protect
us against. Structural review does not satisfy the demands of constitutional theory that both legislators and judges be constrained. The internal critiques suggest that structural review does not constrain judges,
and this external critique shows that it does not constrain legislators
either.
This point can be seen in a different and yet more stimulating light
if we return to the "articulated reasons" branch of structural review. I
suggested that it could be developed into a general requirement for all
legislation. If so, structural review would transform the legislative process. And what would it be transformed into? The image produced by
the structural review cases is of a judicialized legislature, one in which
interests are openly articulated and fairly balanced against each other.
But a judicialized legislature is as much a contradiction within liberal
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theory as a legislative judiciary is a threat to that theory. In the legislative judiciary, judges who are supposed to use reason to constrain the
exercise of will by the legislature, impose their own will on society. In
the judicialized legislature, legislators who are assumed in general to be
creatures of will are supposed to be transformed into beings of reason.
It might be nice if it were so, but liberal theory cannot accommodate
the coexistence of reason and will within a single institution. We have
courts so that reason is able to constrain legislative will; we have constitutional theory so that reason is able to constrain judicial will. That is
precisely why constitutional theory is a futile enterprise.
VII.
Michael Perry's proposal avoids the criticisms I have leveled
against other theories, for he forthrightly-or almost so"-abandons
liberal premises. Liberal political theory distinguishes between will and
reason as the motivation for individual actions." In its political institutions, liberal society allocates will to the legislature and reason to the
courts; but the courts are staffed by individuals who can be willful.
Constitutional theory attempts to limit the willfulness of judges. As I
have argued, none of the current theories succeeds. If reason cannot
limit judges, Perry suggests, we ought to acknowledge, indeed celebrate, the assertion of judicial will by seeing in it the prophetic strand
in the American political tradition. 1 All our judges are, or ought to be,
the Isaiah that Brandeis was. I do not want to deprecate the vision that
underlies Perry's celebration of judicial will. Without substantial reconstruction, though, Perry's theory can lead to quite curious political
positions.
In the first instance, of course, the difficulty is that the process by
which judges are appointed is unlikely to give the kinds of prophets
that Perry wants. For example, one can readily imagine a prophetic
Court holding in the next few years that states are obliged to have
restrictive laws on abortion, obliged to impose stringent limits on the
availability of sexually explicit material, obliged to discriminate against
women, and so on through the social program of the American political
and moral right. What constrains even the conservatives on the present
Court is a combination of respect for state sovereignty and, more important, their adherence to theories of judicial review which they (erroneously) believe constrain them. But, as Perry says, prophets are not.

65. He tries to keep hold on those premises by treating Congress' power to restrict the
jurisdiction of the courts as a serious constraint. See supra notes 16-21 and accompanying text.

66. See supra notes 2-6 and accompanying text.
67. M. PERRY, supra note I. at 97-102.
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constrained in those ways.
Perry treats this as a standard problem of false prophecy, though
he says little more than that false prophecy is a problem. But false
prophecy in Perry's context is a serious and nonstandard difficulty. I
begin by noting that Supreme Court Justices, including Brandeis and
Warren, are, to say the least, not without honor in their own country.
And the point of the biblical observation, I take it, is that being a
prophet and exercising coercive power are incompatible activities. In
one tradition, prophets speak truth to power but they do not exercise it.
Indeed, I would have thought prophets can most effectively call us to
what is right when they have behind them only the moral force of their
passion. Obedience to a prophet's call that has more than the slightest
tinge of coercion to it is unlikely to receive God's blessing. Yet that is
what occurs (subject, of course, to all the political scientists' qualifications about how little compliance there is with controversial Supreme
Court decisions) when the Justices are our prophets. Nor is there any
need to locate prophecy in the Supreme Court. The prophetic voice has
been part of the American tradition, but I would have thought that a
list of prophets would include people like William Sloan Coffin, Martin
Luther King, Jr., and Jerry Falwell, rather than people like Harry
Blackmun or even Louis Brandeis.
Perry's use of the religious metaphor is revealing. He shares with
conservatives and radicals a vision of a society in which all participants
have unalienated relationships and self-understandings; in short, a vision of a community. The conservative imagines a past in which each
person knew and accepted his or her own place. That past, if it ever
existed, was destroyed by the dynamic thrust of economic development
in its capitalist and individualist form. The radical imagines a future in
which the separateness of each of us has been overcome by the elimination of class society. That future, if it ever will exist, will have to overcome the other sources of separateness too, an unlikely occurrence. The
religious vision of a community is simultaneously pernicious and inspiriting. It is pernicious because it imagines that community now exists,
that we "simply" have to reach for the brotherhood of man in the fatherhood of God. It is inspiriting because it tells us that even if community does not now exist, we can begin this moment to create it. We
need not await the revolution that will transform society, for by acting
on our religious inspiration we make society different. Yet, there is
something profoundly depressing about Perry's work. Perhaps it is that
his religious vision is so utterly conventional." As with so much of con-

68. This is especially apparent in the book's final chapter, which offers a notably unprophetic defense of public law litigation. Having been subjected to some of the pressures of getting a
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temporary constitutional law, it turns out that everything converges on
the left-liberal wing of the Democratic Party. 6" It would be pleasant to
discover that God meant us to be truly radical-that our prophets
should be espousing vegetarianism, or unilateral disarmament, or a preemptive nuclear first strike. But when prophets are as moderate as
Perry, it is hard to get enthusiastic.
VIII.
It is time to tie some loose ends together. The inspiriting elements
of Perry's work should lead to a transformation of society. What is the
role of constitutional theory as part of the process of transformation?
Perry's break with liberal theory means that we no longer need be concerned with the kind of exhortation to the courts that has dominated
constitutional theory. At the least, none of us-judges, scholars, or citizens-has greater warrant to the prophetic mantle than any other. As
scholars we can illuminate our society by pursuing the political science
branch of legal realism, using the best techniques we have to describe
and grasp the underlying patterns of constitutional law. The lawyers
were deflected from this point by their understandable desire to influence elite policy-makers. The political scientists were deflected from it
by their mistaken adherence to positivist theories of knowledge. That
led them to scientistic efforts to model judicial behavior and to predict
how the judges would vote on particular issues. Most constitutional
scholars deprecate the political scientists as being merely concerned

with vote-counting and with the effect of judges' breakfasts, and other
elements in their backgrounds, on their votes. I do not. I think the political scientists have made a serious intellectual contribution, generally
underrated, in supporting the realist proposition that we can understand the law better by seeing what the judges do rather than by exam-

ining what they say.7 0 But the lawyers are correct in emphasizing that
the judges do what they do by saying what they say. Further, the pat-

terns that the political scientists have discerned are exceedingly thin.
They differentiate judges along quite conventional dimensions, ignoring
the possibility that the commonalities-what might trendily be called

the deep structure-are more important.
manuscript up to book length, I cannot refrain from noting my suspicion that the final chapter is,
Perry's concession to those pressures.
69. That a position is conventional is not of course an argument that it is wrong. One wonders, however, about the need for a religious metaphor and an elaborate analytic apparatus to
generate conventional conclusions--except, obviously, that conventional defenses of conventional
positions have failed. But then, if one is going to go for unconventionality, why not go all the way?
70. I develop this argument in Tushnet, Critical Legal Studies and Constitutional Law. STAN. L.REV. -
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The legal realists read judicial decisions in which judges said that
they were being guided by values or policies which were independent of
the judges' will. The realist critique of rules told them that the judges
had to be wrong. Something else has to be at work. Will alone was not
enough to explain the law, because the realists knew there were patterns of decision which could not arise unless something underlay them
all. It was just that classical analysis failed to describe the patterns.
For the realists what was at work was social power. Elsewhere I try to
develop that perception by using a nuanced notion of how power operates. That notion heads, I think, to an emphasis on the importance of
community. In this way there are deep affinities between Perry's view
and my own, but they are obscured by Perry's failure to think through
the implications of the social context in which contemporary constitutional law is being made.
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